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Abstract
The enactment of the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011 ushered in a new system for post-
grant patent review. In the interest of enhancing the efficiency of the patent regime by invalidating
“bad” patents, certain requirements were relaxed. For example, the AIA created an examination
process called inter partes review, which allows a party without legal standing to challenge the
validity of a patent in front of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. In the pharmaceutical patent
context, it was expected that inter partes review would be utilized mostly by generic drug makers
seeking to invalidate patents without incurring the significant costs of litigation—including the
extensive research and development required in order to state a case.
Unexpectedly, outside investors have seized inter partes review as a profit-generating opportu-
nity. Investors—most notably hedge fund manager Kyle Bass—target what they believe to be
weak pharmaceutical patents. Such investors then seek an inter partes review of a patent’s validity
while simultaneously short-selling the stock of the pharmaceutical company that owns the patent.
If a patent is successfully invalidated, the pharmaceutical company’s stock likely declines, and as
a result the investors profit from their short position. Although the investors’ activities arguably
invite generic entry to the market, which lowers pharmaceutical prices, the investors are not acting
for altruistic purposes when they challenge patents. This Note argues that this type of investment
behavior abuses the inter partes review process. While much of the literature examining this topic
advocates for a change in the inter partes review standing requirements, this Note recommends
that this exploitative investment strategy is better addressed through financial regulation.
KEYWORDS: Patent, Hedge Fund, Pharmaceutical Patents, Financial Regulation, America In-
vents Act, Insider Trading
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ABSTRACT
The enactment of the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011 ushered in
a new system for post-grant patent review. In the interest of enhancing
the efficiency of the patent regime by invalidating “bad” patents,
certain requirements were relaxed. For example, the AIA created an
examination process called inter partes review, which allows a party
without legal standing to challenge the validity of a patent in front of
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. In the pharmaceutical patent
context, it was expected that inter partes review would be utilized
mostly by generic drug makers seeking to invalidate patents without
incurring the significant costs of litigation—including the extensive
research and development required in order to state a case.
Unexpectedly, outside investors have seized inter partes review as a
profit-generating opportunity. Investors—most notably hedge fund
manager Kyle Bass—target what they believe to be weak
pharmaceutical patents. Such investors then seek an inter partes
review of a patent’s validity while simultaneously short-selling the
stock of the pharmaceutical company that owns the patent. If a patent
is successfully invalidated, the pharmaceutical company’s stock likely
declines, and as a result the investors profit from their short position.
Although the investors’ activities arguably invite generic entry to the
market, which lowers pharmaceutical prices, the investors are not
acting for altruistic purposes when they challenge patents. This Note
argues that this type of investment behavior abuses the inter partes
review process. While much of the literature examining this topic
advocates for a change in the inter partes review standing
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requirements, this Note recommends that this exploitative investment
strategy is better addressed through financial regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a well-known pharmaceutical company produces several
patent-protected drugs. One of the company’s drugs is protected by a
single patent and the patent’s validity is challenged and subsequently
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invalidated in a post-grant review proceeding1 in front of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). As a result, the
pharmaceutical company’s shares immediately plummet. Recognizing an
opportunity for profit, hedge funds have recently adopted a new
investment strategy in which they take a short position in a
pharmaceutical company’s stock and then challenge the validity of one or
more of that company’s pharmaceutical patents. By taking a short
position, hedge funds are essentially betting that the patent will be
invalidated and stock prices will fall. As a result, the shareholder’s loss
likely goes into the hedge fund’s pockets. Unfortunately for the
shareholders, hedge funds are not prohibited from petitioning for post-
grant review and this investment behavior is legal.
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), patent reform
legislation enacted in 2011,2 significantly developed post-grant patent
opposition procedures, which permit individuals to challenge the validity
of patents after grant by the USPTO. Among the major changes the statute
introduced is a new post-grant review proceeding, known as inter partes
review (IPR), which does not require a challenger to have legal standing.3
Therefore, any unrelated third-party may request review of an issued
1. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), established three types of post-grant
proceedings: post grant review, inter partes review, and covered business method. Id.
§18, 125 Stat. at 329–31. The major differences amongst these proceedings include who
may institute the proceeding, which issues are estopped, the standard of proof, the
statutory basis for challenge, and the period during which a proceeding may be brought.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IPR, PGR, AND
CBM,www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/aia_trial_comparison_chart.pptx
[https://perma.cc/7CME-PKDN] (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
2. The AIA was enacted on September 16, 2011, but the provision governing inter
partes review did not go into effect until September 16, 2012. AIA § 35, 125 Stat. at 341.
3. In order for a party to have standing to bring a lawsuit in federal court:
(1) The plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning that the injury is of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent; (2) There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
brought before the court; and (3) It must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
a favorable decision will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560–61 (1992).
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patent. 4 The absence of a standing requirement opens the door for
investors and hedge funds to instigate IPR proceedings; pharmaceutical
patents in particular have become a major target of these investor-initiated
post-grant patent challenges. Investors challenging pharmaceutical
patents do so mainly through IPR proceedings.
This novel investment strategy has made headlines recently 5 as
investors utilize IPR to short-sell the pharmaceutical company’s stock
while also requesting USPTO review of the pharmaceutical company’s
patents. An investor can benefit from short-selling by pocketing the
difference between the price at which it sells borrowed shares and the
lower price at which it buys back the shares when it closes its short
position.6 Short-selling is an investment strategy used when an investor
believes that the value of a stock will decline, such as when the investor
believes a stock is overvalued.7 Additionally, a short position may be
taken to hedge the downside risk of a long position in the same or a closely
related security.8
If the patent is invalidated, the company’s stock price predictably
decreases because patents are major assets for pharmaceutical companies.
Thus, by successfully invalidating a patent through IPR, the investor wins
on their bet against the company’s stock price and reaps the financial
benefits. While invalidating patents may benefit society—such as by
bringing other innovations into the public domain and lowering
pharmaceutical prices—critics argue that investors utilize this strategy to
abuse the IPR system for their own financial benefit.9 They argue this type
of investment behavior in fact discourages innovation, since few
4. “[A] person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition
to institute an inter partes review of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012).
5. See, e.g., Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute
the Patent, Short the Stock, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmace
uticals-patent-1428417408 [https://perma.cc/YMR4-CP7Z].
6. Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortsell
ing.asp [https://perma.cc/S6A7-ZPAP] (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881 (2015);
Sherron Wiggins, Inter Partes Review: Should Hedge Fund Managers be Able to Profit
From Challenging a Patent’s Validity?, 46 SW. L. REV. 147 (2016); Feng Ye, Trading on
the Outcomes of Patent Challenges Short-Selling Petitioners and Possible Modifications
to the Inter Partes Review Process, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARKOFF. SOC’Y 557 (2016).
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pharmaceutical companies will invest in research and development
without strong patent protection.
This Note argues that the utilization of the IPR system by third-
parties should be promoted to invalidate weak patents, thereby allowing
generic pharmaceuticals to enter the market. However, to prevent abuse
of the IPR system, individuals should be prevented from taking a short
position against a company while also initiating an IPR proceeding
against one or more of the company’s patents.
Part I of this Note provides background information on patents, the
AIA, and IPR. Part II examines the effects of investor challenges to
pharmaceutical patents on the patent regime. Part III identifies solutions
to prevent investment behavior that abuses the IPR system. Finally, Part
IV proposes to curb investor abuse of the IPR system through financial
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Congress,
or the courts in furtherance of the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act).10
I. PATENTCHALLENGESUNDER THEAIA
A. PATENTS
A patent grants an inventor a limited monopoly on their invention.
The patent system incentivizes innovation by ensuring that an inventor
will be able to benefit financially from their invention.11 When examining
patent applications, the USPTO determines whether an invention meets
the five requirements of patentability: patentable subject matter, utility,
10. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a
(2012)).
11. Janet Freilich, The Uninformed Topography of Patent Scope, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 150, 155 (2015).
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novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure.12 Although patents are reviewed
for validity by the USPTO, many patents are invalidated post-grant.13
With a patent in place, generic competition is prohibited until the
patent’s expiration. 14 Therefore, during the patent’s term, only the
pharmaceutical company holding the patent on a specific drug may
produce that drug.15 After the expiration of the patent, other companies
may enter the market to compete for market share with the original
producer.16 The drug produced by the original maker tends to be referred
to as a branded drug, while its new competitors are termed generic
drugs.17
12. A claimed invention must fit within one of four statutory categories—“process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”—or constitute an “improvement
thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The invention must also be “new and useful.” Id.
Regarding novelty, the claimed invention must not have been patented previously or
preceded in identical form in public prior art. See id. § 102. Further, an invention may
not be patented “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person
having ordinary skill in the art.” Id. § 103. Finally, for proper disclosure, a patent
specification must include “a written description of the invention” and it must enable a
person having ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. See id. § 112.
13. Id. § 282(b)(2)–(3).
14. Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence:
Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence
Requirement, 66 SMU L. REV. 59, 74 (2013).
15. Davina Rosen, Balancing Business & National Health: The Impact of
Legislation on Pharmaceutical Drug Prices, 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 341,
343 (2007). Production of bioequivalent drugs is an exception. Under the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984), and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-48, §§ 7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010), pharmaceutical
companies may begin production of a bioequivalent drug while the branded drug is still
covered by a patent. See Freilich, supra note 14, at 64–65, 69–70; Ryan Timmis, The
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Potential Problems in the Biologic-
Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 226 (2015).
16. Rosen, supra note 15, at 344.
17. See Generic Drug Facts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely
/GenericDrugs/ucm167991.htm [https://perma.cc/EZK6-MC6L].
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Patent expiration tends to lower pharmaceutical prices because it
allows generic competitors to enter the market.18 As a result, the patent
invalidation benefits not only the litigants but the public-at-large because
it allows competitors to enter the market sooner. However, the business
of invalidating patents is a double-edged sword. Invalidating
pharmaceutical patents may not allow biotechnology companies to recoup
their research and development costs.19 Therefore, without strong patent
protection, few pharmaceutical companies are willing to incur these
expenses, which stymies medical innovation to society’s detriment.
B. AMERICA INVENTSACT AND INTER PARTESREVIEW
One of AIA’s main purposes is to address the prohibitively
expensive costs associated with testing the validity of newly
issued patents that are of questionable quality. These costs traditionally
prevent potential competitors from competing with the patent owner’s
product.20 The validity of patents—including pharmaceutical patents—
can be challenged through litigation, but this is an expensive process.21
Additionally, it has proved difficult for competitors to challenge patents
through litigation without incurring research and development costs at the
outset.22 To address these prohibitive costs, the AIA created three post-
grant patent review procedures to facilitate invalidation challenges: IPR,
Post-Grant Review (PGR), and Covered Business Method review
18. The downward effect on drug prices by generic entry has been observed in the
wake of the Hatch-Waxman Act, fulfilling the legislation’s intent. The first generic drug
to enter the market costs approximately twenty-five percent less than the branded drug
and, after several generics enter the market, costs can drop by up to eighty percent.
Timmis, supra note 15, at 226.
19. Rosen, supra note 15, at 345–46.
20. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II
of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 540, 600–01.
21. Id. (according to an American Intellectual Property Law Association economic
survey, “the average cost of patent litigation, including the costs of discovery, ranges
between $500,000 and [nearly $4 million] per party”).
22. Id. at 601.
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(CBM).23 Since financial institutions exclusively employ IPR in their
short-selling investment strategy,24 this Note primarily focuses on IPR.
As opposed to the traditional litigation route, IPR proceedings
provide an alternative means to challenge a patent’s validity. IPR
proceedings are held at the USPTO instead of in federal court, and provide
a quicker, lower-cost alternative to litigation.25 Congress intended IPR to
serve as a mechanism through which technology companies could fend
off “patent trolls,” or non-practicing entities that acquire patents and
threaten litigation with the objective of obtaining a cash settlement.26 IPR
offers advantages to technology companies aiming to invalidate a patent
troll’s patent, including no presumption of a patent’s validity and a burden
of proof of only a preponderance of the evidence. 27 A variety of
technological patents are challenged through IPR, including
pharmaceutical patents.28
IPR challenges are filed with the USPTO and post-grant reviews are
conducted by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or Board).29 The
PTAB will only grant review of a patent if, based on the petition, “there
23. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321 (2012); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29 § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011).
24. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Costa, Note, Patent System Manipulation: Hedge Funds
Abusing IPR, Poor Patent Quality & Pharmaceutical Monopolies, 35 CARDOZOARTS&
ENT. L.J. 177, 184 (2016); Jennifer Robichaux Carter, Comment, Hedge Funds Should
Be Able to Challenge Patent Validity Using Inter Partes Review Despite Mixed Motives,
54 HOUS. L. REV. 1315, 1318–19 (2017); Yishi Yin, Comment, Avenues for Addressing
the Exploitation of Inter Partes Review Process by Third Parties, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
107, 108 (2016) (online edition).
25. Stephen N. Kulhanek, Note, Inter Partes Review and Federal Litigation: Parallel
Proceedings and Inconsistent Results, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2017); Paul
Barrett, How Patent Trolls Sparked a Failed Assault on High Drug Prices, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20
17-04-10/how-patent-trolls-sparked-a-failed-assault-on-high-drug-prices
[https://perma.cc/NYK9-95LJ].
26. Barrett, supra note 25.
27. Id.
28. Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 101 tbl.5 (2014).
29. Post Grant Review, U.S. PAT. &TRADEMARKOFF., https://www.uspto.gov/paten
ts-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/post-grant-review
[https://perma.cc/GZ74-4WUQ] (last modified May 9, 2017).
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is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail” on one of the
claims.30 An IPR proceeding may only challenge a patent on the basis of
lack of novelty or obviousness.31 Further, IPR allows a third-party to
challenge the validity of a patent.32
The purpose of relaxing the standing requirement in post-grant
proceedings was to enable competitors to bring challenges earlier in a
product’s lifecycle. Therefore, IPR was predicted to be primarily invoked
by parties with business interests in a given patent. 33 However, the
creation of IPR proceedings had the unforeseen consequence of inviting
third-parties lacking business interests in the patents to institute patent
challenges.34
C. COMPARINGHEDGE FUNDS WITH INVALIDATIONASSERTION ENTITIES
Invalidation Assertion Entities (IAEs) entered the patent challenge
landscape when post-grant IPR came into force.35 These entities engage
in rent-seeking36 by demanding payment from patent holders in exchange
for refraining from challenging the patents through the post-grant review
system.37 “The IAE’s financial success depends upon its reputation as a
threat to invalidate patents. This perceived hazard encourages patent
owners to pay to avoid the filing of a threatened petition.”38 IAE activity
30. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). As compared to litigation, there is a high rate of
invalidation of patents challenged through IPR. This is due largely to the fact that IPR
uses lower standards “than litigation for claim construction and burden of proof.” See
Kulhanek, supra note 25, at 1093–94.
31. Id. §§ 102, 103, 311(b).
32. Id. § 311(a).
33. W. Michael Schuster, Rent-Seeking and Inter-Partes Review: An Analysis of
Invalidity Assertion Entities in Patent Law, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 101,
102 (2016).
34. See, e.g., Walker & Copeland, supra note 5 (“[T]he petition process was never
intended to be used as Mr. Bass is employing it.”).
35. See Schuster, supra note 33, at 105.
36. Rent-seeking involves acquiring economic gain without providing a reciprocal
benefit. See Rent-Seeking, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rentsee
king.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
37. Schuster, supra note 33, at 105.
38. Id. at 107.
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is widely criticized as an abuse of the IPR system because IAEs threaten
to file IPR petitions, but often do not.39 In theory, the IPR system is
supposed to create efficiency in the patent landscape by invalidating
“bad” patents. 40 Since IAEs usually are not planning to practice the
subject patent, they are generally willing to settle with the company they
have challenged, a result that is not in line with the aim of the IPR
system.41 IAEs extort money from patent holders, while at the same time
allowing the monopoly to remain in place.42
A hedge fund’s refusal to settle is one of the major differences
between IPR petitions filed by financial institutions and those filed by
IAEs. When a hedge fund challenges a patent, its aim is not to receive a
settlement payment from the pharmaceutical company; rather, the hedge
fund profit strategy relies on the patent being invalidated. In contrast with
IAEs, whose patent challenges rarely positively affect the patent regime,
hedge fund challenges benefit the patent system because they work to
invalidate weak pharmaceutical patents. The patent-invalidating result of
hedge fund IPR petitions contributes to the efficiency of the
pharmaceutical patent regime, but the profit strategy presents a
problematic conflict of interest.
II. NEW INVESTMENT STRATEGYCONSTITUTES IPRABUSE
A. HIGHDRUG PRICES AND EXTENDEDMONOPOLIES
“Per capita drug spending in the U.S. exceeds that in all other
countries.”43 “In 2013, per capita spending on prescription drugs was
$858 compared with an average of $400” in other developed countries.44
The most significant factor that enables “manufacturers to set high prices
is market exclusivity” granted to pharmaceutical manufacturers through
39. Id. at 108–09.
40. Id. at 110.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United
States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 858, 858 (2016).
44. Id.
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government-protected monopoly rights. 45 While generic entry to the
market tends to depress prices, the availability of lower-cost generic drugs
may be delayed where a patent monopoly is extended.46
Since monopoly rights keep drug prices—and therefore profits—
high, pharmaceutical companies have an incentive to attempt to extend
their monopoly on the production of a specific drug. One strategy
pharmaceutical companies employ to prevent a generic from entering the
market is to create a new drug with minor variations that does not
significantly enhance the clinical benefit of the drug, but extends the
patent nonetheless.47 Another strategy to extend the life of a patent is
known as “pay-for-delay.” 48 This scenario arises when a branded
company’s drug is approaching patent expiration, and a generic
manufacturer challenges the patent so it might start producing and selling
the drug.49 Rather than allow a generic manufacturer to challenge its
monopoly, a branded company may choose to pay a large monetary
settlement to the generic maker if it agrees not to enter the market for a
45. Id. A study by researchers at Harvard Medical School made five key findings
regarding prescription drug prices in the U.S.: (1) drug manufacturers in the United States
set their own prices, which is not the norm elsewhere in the world; (2) the United States
allows “government-protected monopolies” for certain drugs, preventing generic
versions from entering the market and driving prices down; (3) Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval of generic drugs takes a long time, effectively extending
the monopoly on the patented drug; (4) certain state laws (such as requiring patient
consent before switching to a generic drug) and federal policies limit the capacity of
companies producing generics to keep prices down; (5) drug prices are not truly justified
by research and development costs—they are based on what the market will bear. See
generally id. Some scholars argue that the regulatory environment allows pharmaceutical
patent monopolies to persist for too long. See, e.g., Costa, supra note 24, at 191.
46. Kesselheim, supra note 43, at 858.
47. See generallyHimanshu Gupta et al., Patent Protection Strategies, J. PHARMACY
& BIOALLIED SCI., Jan.–Mar. 2010, at 1, 4–6 (discussing the ways in which a
pharmaceutical company can extend a drug’s commercial lifecycle, including new
formulations, new uses, and new routes of administration for known drugs).
48. SeeMichael L. Fialkoff, Note, Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the Wake ofActavis,
20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 523, 523 (2014). In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013), the Supreme Court found that pay-for-delay settlements may
violate antitrust laws. “The Actavis decision makes it clear that a large, unexplained
reverse payment is unlikely to stand up to antitrust scrutiny.” Fialkoff, supra, at 539.
49. See Fialkoff, supra note 48, at 524.
312 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
specific period, ensuring a continued monopoly for that period.50 As with
other strategies for extending a monopoly, this tactic maintains the drug’s
price and therefore the branded-drug maker’s profits.51
B. STRIKING A LEGISLATIVEBALANCE
In regard to pharmaceutical patents, Congress has attempted to strike
a middle ground between encouraging low prices and incentivizing
innovation. For example, in 1984 Congress enacted the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman).52
Hatch-Waxman created an abbreviated new drug application process,53
increasing the speed by which generic versions of traditional small
molecule drugs54 reach the market after patent expiration by requiring
generic manufacturers to only demonstrate bioequivalence55 rather than
engage in lengthy, costly, and duplicative clinical trials.56 Hatch-Waxman
had a dual purpose: to incentivize pharmaceutical companies to continue
investing in the research and development of new drugs and to decrease
drug prices by increasing generic competition in the pharmaceutical
market.57
50. Id. at 524–25.
51. Id. at 530.
52. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
54. Small molecule drugs are synthesized through chemical processes. See Herbert
M. Huttanus et al., Metabolic Engineering for Production of Small Molecule Drugs:
Challenges and Solutions, FERMENTATION, 2016, at 2.
55. The FDA has defined bioequivalence as “the absence of a significant difference
in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical
equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action
when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an appropriately
designed study.” 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (2009).
56. See Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD&DRUGL.J. 417, 417–
18 (2011).
57. Id.
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While Hatch-Waxman created a pathway to the market for small
molecule drugs, which comprise over ninety percent of drugs on the
market,58 the statute did not address biotechnology drugs or “biologics.”59
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act),
signed into law by President Obama in 2010, enacted the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCI). 60 This legislation,
mirroring Hatch-Waxman, created “an abbreviated approval pathway for
biological products that are demonstrated to be ‘highly similar’
(biosimilar) to or ‘interchangeable’ with an FDA-approved biological
product.” 61 The goal of the BPCI is consistent with Hatch-Waxman,
58. See Small and Large Molecules, BAYER, http://pharma.bayer.com/en/innovation
-partnering/technologies-and-trends/small-and-large-molecules/
[https://perma.cc/GSQ9-CH9F] (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).
59. Biologics, or biopharmaceuticals, are drugs made of large protein molecules that
are replicas of naturally-occurring endogenous human proteins. Kristina M. Lybecker,
The Biologics Revolution in the Production of Drugs, FRASER INST., July 2016, at 1.
These drugs are produced through genetic engineering rather than through typical
chemical synthesis. Id. at 3.
60. Implementation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009,
U.S. FOOD&DRUGADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatory
information/ucm215089.htm [https://perma.cc/S6L6-ANWR] (last updated Feb. 2, 2016)
[hereinafter FDA Biologics Price Competition]. The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended the Public Health Service
Act, chs. 371–373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to
300mm-61 (2012)).
61. See FDA Biologics Price Competition, supra note 60. “A biosimilar product is a
biological product that is approved based on a showing that it is highly similar to an FDA-
approved biological product, known as a reference product, and has no clinically
meaningful differences in terms of safety and effectiveness from the reference product.
Only minor differences in clinically inactive components are allowable in biosimilar
products. An interchangeable biological product is biosimilar to an FDA-approved
reference product and meets additional standards for interchangeability. An
interchangeable biological product may be substituted for the reference product by a
pharmacist without the intervention of the health care provider who prescribed the
reference product.” Information on Biosimilars, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (emphasis
in original), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsare
DevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/Biosi
milars/ [https://perma.cc/83Y2-53K2] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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namely, to incentivize innovation while simultaneously facilitating the
entry of generic pharmaceuticals into the market.62
C. BASS’SNOVEL INVESTMENT STRATEGY
A short sale is the sale of a security motivated by the belief that the
security price will decline.63 By taking a short position on a particular
security, an investor will profit if the value of that security does
indeed fall; thus, a short sale is, in essence, a bet against the stock value
of a company. 64 Although many criticisms are launched against this
investment strategy, most short-selling activity remains legal.65
Hedge fund manager Kyle Bass, head of Hayman Capital
Management LP, has made a reputation and an investment strategy out of
short-selling the stock of pharmaceutical companies while simultaneously
62. Timmis, supra note 15, at 226 (arguing that the BCPI Act is unlikely to fulfill its
purpose of decreasing biologic drug prices because of biologic manufacturing costs as
well as the Act’s long exclusivity periods and high interchangeability standards).
63. The following is the SEC’s definition of a short sale: “A short sale is the sale of
a stock that a seller does not own or a sale which is consummated by the delivery of a
stock borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller. Short sales are normally settled by
the delivery of a security borrowed by or on behalf of the seller. The short seller later
closes out the position by returning the borrowed security to the stock lender, typically
by purchasing securities on the open market. Short sellers typically hope to profit from a
downward price movement or seek to hedge the risk of a long position in the same or a
related security.” Fast Answers: Short Sell Restrictions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortrestrict.htm [https://perma.cc/9GGN-
8JMB] (last modified Apr. 13, 2015).
64. Id.
65. See Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortse
lling.asp [https://perma.cc/6KK9-BV7V] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). With a technique
called ‘short and distort,’ investors “manipulate stock prices in a bear market by taking
short positions and then us[e] a smear campaign to drive down the price of the targeted
stock.” Rick Wyman, The Short and Distort: Stock Manipulation in a Bear Market,
INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 30, 2016, 5:02 PM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/analyst/
030102.asp?lgl=rira-layout [https://perma.cc/S562-DHYY]. While these types of
ethically questionable short-selling activity remain legal, “naked shorting,” the practice
of short selling shares “that have not been affirmatively determined to exist,” has been
deemed illegal. Naked Shorting, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/n
akedshorting.asp [https://perma.cc/CJ7K-4VXR] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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bringing IPR challenges against their patents.66 Although his innovative
strategy has inspired copycats, this investment technique is most
commonly associated with Bass due to his aggressive utilization of it.67
Bass’s first target was Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. In February 2015,
he filed IPR petitions challenging two patents on Ampyra®,68 a nerve
strengthening drug for individuals with multiple sclerosis.69 Bass’s IPR
filing drew immediate attention from the investment world and the stock
of Acorda fell nearly ten percent.70 When Bass filed a second petition
against an Ampyra® patent, Acorda stock fell by nearly five percent.71
Together, these changes in stock value constituted approximately $165
million in lost market value.72
66. SeeWalker & Copeland, supra note 5. While Kyle Bass is not the only investor
utilizing the short-selling IPR petition strategy, he is the most well-known.
67. Tucker N. Terhufen & Tasha M. Francis, A Mixed Bag for Kyle Bass: Three
Wins and Eight Losses at the PTAB, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.lexology.c
om/library/detail.aspx?g=27c6aa3e-a931-44df-a8ad-d237031e154f [https://perma.cc/8
RVC-UL2Q]. Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. has utilized the same investment
strategy. In October 2015, PTAB granted the hedge fund’s IPR petitions and instituted
review of a VirnetX patent. Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. VirnetX Inc., No.
IPR2015-01046 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2015).
68. Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 8,663,685, Coal. for
Affordable Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., No. IPR2015-00720
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2015); Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 8,007,826,
Coal. for Affordable Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., No. IPR2015-
00817 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2015).
69. Learn About the Walking Pill, AMPYRA, https://ampyra.com/what-is-ampyra
[https://perma.cc/2XJU-97BT] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
70. Robert Cyran, Kyle Bass Wields New Weapon in Challenging Drug Makers,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015, 2:36 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/kyle-
bass-wields-new-weapon-in-challenging-drug-makers/ [https://perma.cc/CJ6G-JAU].
The stock fell on the same day the IPR petition was instituted. Id. Acorda draws nearly
all of its revenue from Ampyra®, id., so the company would take a large hit if generic
competition were allowed to enter the market sooner than expected.
71. Matthew P. Larson, Litigation Trading: An Introduction to Wall Street’s Interest
in Patent Cases, 8 LANDSLIDE, no. 1, 2015, at 6.
72. Id.
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Bass organized the Coalition for Affordable Drugs (CFAD),
consisting of multiple LLCs,73 as a proxy through which to file patent
challenges with the USPTO.74 In addition to Acorda, Bass has targeted a
number of other pharmaceutical companies with his unusual investment
strategy: Anacor Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Biogen International GmbH,
Biogen Idec MA, Inc., Biogen MA, Inc., Bristol-Myers Squibb
Corporation, Celgene Corporation, Citius Pharmaceuticals, Cosmo
Technologies Ltd., Fresenius Kabi, Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., Insys
Pharma, Inc., NPS Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Pharmacyclics, Inc., Pozen,
Inc., and Shire Inc.75 Bass even brought a challenge against the Trustees
of the University of Pennsylvania.76
Since he began instituting post-grant patent challenges in early 2015,
“Bass has filed 37 IPR petitions, challenging 30 patents covering 17
drugs.”77 The PTAB instituted review of twenty-one of these petitions.78
The Board does not automatically institute IPRs, but first reviews the
petition and, if filed, the optional patent owner’s preliminary response.79
The PTAB will institute a proceeding where the petitioner shows a
“reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”80 In fiscal year 2015,
the Board instituted seventy-four percent of petitions.81
Two opposing parties declined to respond to petitions filed by Bass,
resulting in canceled claims.82 Since the specific patent claims challenged
were invalidated, the patent owners could no longer claim monopoly over
73. In 2015, Bass formed fifteen Delaware limited liability companies. Department
of State: Division of Corporations: General Information Name Search, ST. DEL.,
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx (in the “Entity
Name” field search “Coalition for Affordable Drugs”) (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
74. Walker & Copeland, supra note 5.
75. Terhufen & Francis, supra note 67.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2012).
80. Id. § 314(a).
81. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, AIA PROGRESS: AIA PETITION
DISPOSITIONS (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/030515_aia_
stat_graph.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YMM-S6ZC].
82. Terhufen & Francis, supra note 67.
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those aspects of their patents.83 Bass has successfully “invalidated patents
in 9 of the 18 IPRs” in which a final decision has been issued; 11 of these
final decisions were issued in March 2017.84 One petition, involving the
drug Diprivan®, remains under review and awaits final decision.85 Where
an IPR is instituted and not dismissed, the AIA mandates the
Board to issue a final written decision.86 “The decision shall address the
patentability of any challenged patent claim and any new claim added via
amendment during the inter partes review.”87 The following table details
Bass’s IPR record thus far.88
Table 1: Results of IPR Proceedings Initiated by Bass
IPR
Case
No.
Filing
Date
Patent Owner Drug US
Patent
No.
Claims
Invalidated
IPR2015
-00988
4/1/15 Shire Inc./Cosmo
Technologies Ltd.
Lialda® 6,773,720 None
IPR2015
-00990
4/1/15 NPS
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Gattex® 7,056,886 46-52 and
61-75 of 75
IPR2015
-01092
4/23/15 Celgene
Corporation
Pomalyst®
and
Revlimid®
6,045,501 1-10 (all)
IPR2015
-01093
4/23/15 NPS
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Gattex® 7,056,886 1-27, 31-40,
and 44-45
83. If a patent is deemed invalid, the appurtenant monopoly and licensing rights are
extinguished. See, e.g., Xiang Yu & Anjan Chatterji, Why Brand Pharmaceutical
Companies Choose to Pay Generics in Settling Patent Disputes: A Systematic Evaluation
of the Asymmetic Risks in Litigation, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 19, 22 (2011).
84. Terhufen & Francis, supra note 67.
85. Id.
86. America Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-
act-aia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked#3239 [https://perma.cc/69R8-G58X]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
87. Id.
88. Terhufen & Francis, supra note 67.
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IPR2015
-01096
4/23/15 Celgene
Corporation
Pomalyst®
and
Revlimid®
6,315,720 1-32 (all)
IPR2015
-01102
4/23/15 Celgene
Corporation
Pomalyst®
and
Revlimid®
6,315,720 1-32 (all)
IPR2015
-01103
4/23/15 Celgene
Corporation
Pomalyst®
and
Revlimid®
6,315,720 1-32 (all)
IPR2015
-01718
8/12/15 Horizon Pharma
USA
Vimovo® 8,945,621 None
IPR2015
-01776
8/20/15 Anacor
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Kerydin® 7,582,621 1-12 (all)
IPR2015
-01780
8/20/15 Anacor
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Kerydin® 7,767,657 1-24 (all)
IPR2015
-01785
8/20/15 Anacor
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Kerydin® 7,767,657 1-24 (all)
IPR2015
-01835
8/28/15 The Trustees of
the University of
Pennsylvania
Juxtapid® 8,618,135 None
IPR2015
-01836
8/28/15 The Trustees of
the University of
Pennsylvania
Juxtapid® 7,932,268 None
IPR2015
-01850
9/2/15 Acorda
Therapeutics, Inc.
Ampyra® 8,440,703 None
IPR2015
-01853
9/2/15 Acorda
Therapeutics, Inc.
Ampyra® 8,007,826 None
IPR2015
-01857
9/2/15 Acorda
Therapeutics, Inc.
Ampyra® 8,663,685 None
IPR2015
-01858
9/2/15 Acorda
Therapeutics, Inc.
Ampyra® 8,354,437 None
IPR2015
-01993
9/28/15
Biogen MA, Inc.
Tecfidera
®
8,399,514 None
IPR2016
-00245
11/24/15
Alpex Pharma Suprenza® 8,440,170
1-3, 5-6, and
8-9
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IPR2016
-00694
3/1/16 Nissan Chemical
Industries, Ltd.
Bravecto
™
8,796,464 1
Celgene believed that Bass’s challenges were not in good faith, so in
response to his petitions, Celgene filed a motion for sanctions, requesting
dismissal of five Coalition for Affordable Drugs IPR petitions.89 The
PTAB decision rejected Celgene’s argument that “the [p]etitions are
driven entirely by an admitted ‘profit motive’ unrelated to the purpose of
the [AIA], and unrelated to a competitive interest in the validity of the
challenged patents.”90 Significantly, the decision noted, “[p]rofit is at the
heart of nearly every patent and nearly every inter partes review. As such,
an economic motive for challenging a patent claim does not itself raise
abuse of process issues.”91 The Board ultimately concluded that Celgene
had not met the evidentiary burden—preponderance of the evidence92—
to prove an abuse of process by the petitioner.93
Bass defends his investment strategy by asserting that his patent
challenges will help reduce pharmaceutical prices.94 “#Some patents and
extensions to patents represent an unreasonable use of government
regulation to enshrine monopoly power to the detriment of the public at
large,& Mr. Bass said. ‘This system must be fixed or we will continue to
pay more and more for the same old drugs we’ve been buying for
89. Coal. for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092, at 2
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015).
90. Id. at 2, 5 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 3. PTAB declined to take a “position on the merits of short-selling as an
investment strategy,” noting only that it is both “legal, and regulated.” Id.
92. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012).
93. Celgene, at 2 (citations omitted).
94. See generally, Walker & Copeland, supra note 5.
320 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
decades.’”95 Bass bolsters this defense by claiming that he refuses to
settle.96
Bass likely refuses to settle because an out-of-court settlement would
undermine his investment strategy.97 He relies on public reaction to the
filing of an IPR petition in order to realize gain on his short sale. Although
Bass asserts that his cause is noble, if he were truly dedicated to clearing
the patent system of weak patents, he would appeal IPRs decided against
him.98 “Bass has not appealed a single [PTAB] decision to the Federal
Circuit.”99 Thus, although Bass might attempt to distinguish CFAD from
IAEs, the truth is that CFAD’s goals are no more altruistic. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that the patents invalidated by Bass have resulted in
generic entry into the market.100
95. See Gretchen Morgenson, Working to Lower Drug Costs by Challenging
Questionable Patents, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/2
9/business/working-to-lower-drug-costs-by-challenging-questionable-patents.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/8HYC-MU25]. Erich Spangenberg is Bass’s colleague in the patent-
challenge effort; they formed Coalition for Affordable Drugs together in 2015. Id. Mr.
Spangenberg echoes Bass’s sentiments in regards to pharmaceutical prices: “‘Zombie
drugs–those unworthy of patent protection because they are not novel and truly
innovative–are being artificially kept alive to the financial detriment of patients and
taxpayers,’Mr. Spangenberg said. ‘This system is both broken and rigged.’” Id.
96. Id. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of how Bass’s strategy differs that of
Invalidation Assertion Entities, which often settle.
97. Carl J. Minniti III, The Big (Patent) Short, RUTGERS INST. FOR INFO. POL’Y&L.
(Mar. 8, 2016), http://riipl.rutgers.edu/the-big-patent-short/ [https://perma.cc/YT9Y-
Q4Y4].
98. There is a question of whether CFAD would have standing to appeal a PTAB
decision to the Federal Circuit. When a dissatisfied party seeks judicial review of an
agency decision in a federal court “the constitutional requirement that it have standing
kicks in.” Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015).
99. Id.
100. It is likely that some generic entry will eventually result from Bass’s patent
invalidation activity, but generic entry has not been an immediate result of his investment
strategy. This is due in large part to the fact that most pharmaceuticals are protected by
multiple patents. For example, although Bass was successful in invalidating four of the
five patents on the drug Ampyra, the fifth patent—relating to sustained release—is set to
expire in mid-2018, and therefore generic competition to Ampyra will likely surface in
2018. Carly Helfand, Court Nixes Acorda Patents, Teeing Up Ampyra Generics–and
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D. BASS’S INVESTMENTBEHAVIORCONSTITUTES IPRABUSE
If patents are truly weak, they should be invalidated to allow
competitors to enter the market and create price competition. IPR is an
efficient way to achieve this. However, Bass’s investment strategy abuses
the IPR system because the investor is in a position to benefit financially
from nonpublic information. Bass first files IPR petitions with the
USPTO. The investor then takes a position shorting the stock of the
patent-holding pharmaceutical company. After he has taken a position,
Bass publicly discloses the pharmaceutical company whose patent he is
challenging. At news of the patent challenge, the stock of the company
often declines and Bass benefits from his short sale. Bass’s activity has
been criticized as stock market manipulation. 101 Bass’s investment
behavior also exploits a window of time in which he is an outside trader
privy to material, nonpublic information until the USPTO publishes the
IPR petition. Bass’s strategy constitutes abuse of the IPR system because,
as with illegal investment activities, he benefits financially from the
manipulation or misuse of critical information.
III. POTENTIALMETHODS TOCURBABUSE OF THE IPR SYSTEM
Existing literature has addressed hedge fund abuse of the IPR system.
The popular solution is to alter the IPR standing requirement, either
directly through USPTO rulemaking, or through judicial review or
congressional action.102 Another possible solution is regulation of Bass-
like conflict of interest investment behavior through the SEC, although
Potential Cost Cuts, Analyst Says, FIERCEPHARMA (Apr. 3, 2017, 10:33 AM)
http://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/court-nixes-4-acorda-patents-teeing-up-amprya-
generics-for-2018 [https://perma.cc/74KH-DDV4]. Thus, although Bass’s challenges
have not had an immediate impact on the availability of generic pharmaceuticals, it can
realistically be expected that in the coming years the drugs Bass targeted will face generic
competition. However, given Bass’s limited IPR success, his activity is unlikely to result
in a large-scale facilitation of generic market entrants.
101. At least one author alleges that Bass’s investment strategy is “blatant illegal
market manipulation.” Costa, supra note 24, at 178.
102. See, e.g., Wiggins, supra note 9; Ye, supra note 9; Yin, supra note 24.
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this solution has been largely dismissed in the academic literature.103
Finally, some propose that inaction is the best reaction to hedge fund
utilization of the IPR system.104
A. USPTORULEMAKING
One way to prevent hedge funds from unfairly taking advantage of
the IPR system is for the USPTO to strengthen the standing requirement
such that only parties with a real interest105 in the subject patent may
institute IPR proceedings. “If the AIA implemented IPRs in part to
eliminate low quality patents, it follows that the most knowledgeable, and
therefore successful, petitioners that can best eliminate those patents
come from within the industry the patent resides.”106 The USPTO could
also more overtly implement a regulation that prohibits an IPR filing by
any petitioner who “operate[s] a hedge fund” or engages in “a strategy
for shorting stock.” 107 Such a regulation would prevent hedge funds
operators—like Kyle Bass—from using IPR petitions in conjunction with
shorting stock to earn profits.108
The USPTO is empowered to establish regulations governing
proceedings in the office.109 Further, through the AIA, the Director of the
USPTO was granted broad rulemaking power in regard to IPR: “[t]he
Director shall prescribe regulations . . . establishing and governing inter
partes review under this chapter.” 110 Notably, that rulemaking power
includes “prescribing sanctions for abuse of discovery, abuse of process,
103. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 24.
104. See, e.g., Robichaux Carter, supra note 24.
105. An interested party is “[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought; anyone
who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a right to control the proceedings,
make a defense, or appeal from an adverse judgment.” Party, BLACK’SLAWDICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
106. Yin, supra note 24, at 134 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 135.
108. Yin writes that such a rule would capture pharmaceutical companies’ criticism
that “one should not be able to use IPR for pecuniary gain through hedge funds, short
selling, or other financial instruments.” Id.
109. “The Office . . . may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which shall
govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012).
110. Id. § 316(a)(4).
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or any other improper use of the proceeding.”111 When prescribing IPR
regulations, the Director is instructed to “consider the effect of any such
regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient
administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely
complete proceedings.”112
While the USPTO ostensibly has the rulemaking authority to change
the standing requirements to prohibit investors and hedge funds from
instituting IPR proceedings, the PTAB has demonstrated that it does not
consider such petitions to be an abuse of the system, and is therefore
unlikely to engage in such rulemaking. The Board’s position came to light
in its aforementioned decision denying Celgene’s motion for sanctions
against CFAD.113 There, the Board disagreed with petitioner’s statement
that the challenges were contrary to the AIA’s intended purpose, noting
that the purpose of the AIA was not limited to providing a less expensive
alternative to litigation.114 Rather, “the AIA sought to establish a more
efficient and streamlined patent system that improved patent quality,
while at the same time limiting unnecessary and counterproductive
litigation costs.” The Board found that the legislation was intended to
incentivize meritorious third-party IPR challenges in order to enhance
patent quality.115
Although unlikely, if the USPTO does change its regulations, the
ideal standing rule would be a narrow prohibition that prevents an
individual or company that has shorted the stock of a company from filing
an IPR challenge on a patent owned by that company. A limited
prohibition as proposed would maintain the AIA’s efficiency goal as it
would only preclude a patent challenge where there is a financial conflict
of interest while permitting standing in all other circumstances.
111. Id. § 316(a)(6).
112. Id. § 316(b).
113. Coal. for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092, at 5
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015).
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id.
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B. JUDICIALREVIEW
The PTAB’s final written IPR decision is directly appealable to the
Federal Circuit.116 Another way to address the standing requirement is to
await an opportune case for judicial review. Policymaking through
judicial review presents both pros and cons.117 The specialization and
complexity of technology and science weigh against decision-making by
a judge who is not an expert in the field.118 However, a court may not be
distracted by the political biases that can exist in Congress and
governmental agencies, and therefore may be more capable of an
impartial decision when it comes to policymaking.119
More practically, a significant drawback to judicial rulemaking as a
solution is that it requires waiting for the right case to reach the Federal
Circuit. Further, the AIA and USPTO rules regarding standing are
unambiguous, so it is likely that the court would leave any alterations to
Congress or the USPTO rather than engage in judicial rulemaking.
C. CONGRESSIONALACTION
Another potential solution is for Congress to enact legislation to
prevent investors and hedge funds from filing IPR petitions. 120 Two
methods stand out as avenues through which Congress can address the
issue.121 The first method is to amend 35 U.S.C. § 311 to impose a
standing requirement on the IPR procedure such that only parties “with a
real competitive interest in the underlying technology contained in the
patent” have standing to file petitions.122 However, the drawback to such
116. “A party to a derivation proceeding who is dissatisfied with the final decision of
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in the proceeding may appeal the decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 141(d)(2012).
117. Yin, supra note 24, at 138.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 139.
120. The Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
121. Yin, supra note 24, at 141–42.
122. Id. at 141.
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an extreme route is that it may hinder the AIA’s purpose of invalidating
weak patents by prohibiting “genuinely altruistic third parties” from filing
IPR petitions.123 The second method is for Congress to amend 35 U.S.C.
§ 316(a)(6) to further define sanctionable abuse of the IPR process.124
This method is preferable because its limited scope would continue to
allow most proper IPR challenges.
Two patent reform bills are currently pending in Congress: the
Innovation Act125 and the PATENT Act.126 Both bills require significant
specificity in infringement pleadings before the PTAB and federal district
courts.127 Specifically, the Innovation Act requires the identification of
patent claims asserted and specification of the accused method or acts.128
This heightened pleading requirement would hinder a Bass-like strategy
as it would require the plaintiff to prove most of its case for discovery to
proceed, rendering the proceeding timely and costly.129 The PATENTAct
proposes reforms similar to those addressed in the Innovation Act.130
D. FINANCIALREGULATION
Federal regulatory agencies have thus far avoided involvement with
Bass’s investment practices. This is likely because arguments that Bass
has violated any regulations are quite attenuated; his behavior does not
match any legal theory under which unethical trading practice has
historically been penalized. Although dismissive of SEC regulation as a
solution, some authors have recognized this possibility. Yin, for example,
has commented that the SEC “has remained curiously silent throughout
the proceedings taking place at the intersection of the USPTO and
financiers,” while noting that the SEC’s regulatory authority may not
capture the investment behavior at issue.131
123. Id. at 141–42.
124. Id. at 142.
125. H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
126. S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015).
127. Id. § 3(b); H.R. 9 § 3(a).
128. S. 1137 § 3(b).
129. Costa, supra note 24, at 193.
130. H.R. 9 § 3(a).
131. Yin, supra note 24, at 136.
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Yin suggests that two SEC regulatory theories—stock
manipulation and insider trading—could apply.132 However, Yin argues
that the theories are “extremely attenuated and nuanced at best.”133 Stock
manipulation and insider trading are both regulated under Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act.134 Stock manipulation in violation of Rule 10b-5135
“refers generally to practices . . . that are intended to mislead investors
by artificially affecting market activity.”136 Regarding insider trading,
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “are violated when a corporate insider
trades in the securities of [their] corporation on the basis of material,
nonpublic information.” 137 See infra Part IV for a discussion of the
application of the theories of stock manipulation and insider trading to
conflict of interest investment behavior.
E. INACTION
Individuals who believe the best solution is inaction are concerned
that eliminating third-parties’ ability to institute IPR proceedings could
be detrimental to the public interest. 138 Specifically, they worry that
narrowing the standing requirement will make it more difficult to
invalidate weak pharmaceutical patents which, if canceled, would
significantly decrease drug prices.139 One author posits that hedge funds
should be able to challenge patents because “[t]he more opportunities the
132. Id. at 136–37.
133. Id. at 136.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 210.10b-5 (2017).
136. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
137. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
138. See, e.g., Robichaux Carter, supra note 24.
139. Id. at 1316 (“It is important for third parties who represent the interests of the
public domain to have an opportunity to participate in the discussion over a patent’s
validity—even in instances where public interests are subordinated by personal motives.
By allowing third parties who represent the public interest to challenge patents, Congress
prevents biotechnology companies and their direct competitors from entrenching the
patent system with patent [owners’] interests without any balancing consideration for
public domain interests.”).
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patent system provides for public interest representatives to challenge
invalid patents, the stronger the United States’ patent system will be.”140
Inaction is arguably preferable to a change in the standing
requirement, which would obstruct clearing out weak patents. However,
inaction would not address the iniquity that results from conflict of
interest investment behavior. An ideal solution should both encourage
generic entry into the market as well as prohibit investors and hedge funds
from abusing the IPR system. By enabling those actors to continue to
challenge pharmaceutical patents, we are allowing them to force down the
value of those companies, which reduces the public’s confidence
in the companies and may affect investment.141 Therefore, by extension,
investors and hedge funds are pocketing money that may otherwise go
toward the research and development of new lifesaving drugs.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: TREATBASS’S INVESTMENT STRATEGY AS
MARKETMANIPULATION OR INSIDERTRADING
Individuals who support strengthening the IPR standing requirement
are concerned that post-grant patent challenges stifle innovation by
making it easier for patents to be invalidated. Critics overlook that IPR
only invalidates patents that should not have been granted in the first
instance. Indeed, those who propose that hedge funds should be left to
their own devices regarding IPR challenges acknowledge that hedge
funds accumulating financial benefit is not an ideal outcome, but believe
it is important to leave in place a system where third-parties may
challenge weak patents.142 To that extent, post-grant patent challenges
will not stymie the inventions and improvements of truly innovative
companies, but merely clear the way for generic companies to enter the
market where monopolies are no longer deserved.
Moreover, the proposed solutions—utilizing one channel or another
to modify the standing requirement—may prevent the exact behavior that
should be promoted, namely, the challenging of weak patents. Adjusting
the standing requirement so investors and hedge funds cannot bring
challenges preemptively prohibits a deep-pocketed white knight
140. Id. at 1346.
141. See supra Part II.
142. Robichaux Carter, supra note 24, at 1321–24.
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individually, or in tandem with an advocacy group, from bringing a patent
challenge.
Bass’s investment behavior is ethically questionable not only in its
misuse of the IPR system, but also because of its effect on the market.
SEC enforcement of abusive investment practices in relation to IPR
filings is a narrowly tailored solution that would curb a significant source
of abuse of the IPR system while still permitting the system to function
as intended.143 Although Bass’s investment strategy is novel and has not
yet been challenged by the SEC, the behavior could be treated as insider
trading or as market manipulation and general securities fraud. 144 At
present, these arguments are attenuated, as this type of investment
behavior was not anticipated by existing regulations and has not yet been
found to violate the same. However, because other possible solutions are
inadequate, the SEC, Congress, and courts are invited to curb this type of
investment practice, either by finding that it violates current regulations
or by amending regulations to prohibit such behavior.
A. INSIDER TRADING
Conflict of interest investment activity can be curtailed by treating it
as insider trading. Insider trading involves making a securities trade on
the basis of knowledge of material, nonpublic information.145 While not
all insider trading is prohibited, “[i]llegal insider trading refers generally
to buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other
relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of
143. Costa has suggested that investment activity like Bass’s should be prohibited as
market manipulation, but that long-term solutions are needed to ensure strong patents and
prevent abuse of the patent system once hedge funds are no longer able to bring IPR
challenges. See Costa, supra note 24, at 200. He proposes a two-step solution: “First,
pharmaceutical prescription drug patents should be required to undergo a more rigorous
approval process, making it more difficult for them to receive bad patents. . . . Second,
there must be regulatory change addressing the tactics of the pharmaceutical industry to
maintain their monopolistic hold over drug pricing.” Id. at 200–01.
144. Id.
145. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52.
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material, nonpublic information about the security.”146 Bass cannot be
characterized as a classic insider, for he is not an insider of the companies
whose stock he short sells, and therefore he does not owe fiduciary duties
to the shareholders of those companies. However, an individual who
challenges a patent at the PTAB should be considered a temporary insider
until the proceeding becomes public knowledge.147 Thus, a short sale of
the stock of the patent-owning company would be considered insider
trading in contravention of the Exchange Act. Expanding the definition
of insider trading to include someone with a conflict of interest is
supported by the public interest purpose of the Exchange Act—“to insure
the maintenance of fair and honest markets.”148 Further, an expanded
definition tracks with the trend in case law to expand the scope of liability
for insider trading.149
Courts have recognized that an insider’s duty to refrain from insider
trading results from the fiduciary duties owed to the shareholders of a
corporation.150 An insider has traditionally been defined as an officer,
director, or controlling shareholder;151 these individuals are prohibited
from trading on material, non-public information. Although classical
insiders were the group that the Exchange Act regulation initially
146. Fast Answers: Insider Training, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersinsiderhtm.html [https://perma.cc/GGA5-6R
RB] (last modified Jan. 15, 2013).
147. See supra Part II D.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
149. See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009); SEC v. Cuban, 798 F.
Supp. 2d 783 (N.D. Tex. 2011). These two insider trading cases are significant because
“they depart from established Supreme Court precedent requiring the breach of a
traditional fiduciary or similar duty as an element of the offense.” Joel M. Cohen, Erosion
of the Fidcuciary Duty Requirement in Insider Trading Actions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE&FIN. REG. (July 29, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/
07/29/erosion-of-the-fiduciary-duty-requirement-in-insider-trading-actions/
[https://perma.cc/V424-VVNY]. See also Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016);
United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017).
150. Moin A. Yahya, The Law & Economics of “Sue and Dump”: Should Plaintiffs’
Attorneys Be Prohibited from Trading the Stock of Companies They Sue?, 39 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 425, 459–60 (2006).
151. Insider, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insider.asp [http
s://perma.cc/6YRA-F2FF] (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
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targeted, changing business practices require reevaluating how an insider
is defined.
Indeed, the need to recognize a “short-selling plaintiff” as a
temporary insider has been acknowledged in academic literature. Yahya
proposes a separate category for short-selling plaintiffs, in which they are
deemed constructive or temporary insiders until such time as knowledge
of the lawsuit has become public.152 Yahya’s category should include not
only the “short-selling plaintiff,” but also an individual with a conflict of
interest such as Bass, who might be termed a “short-selling petitioner.153
Whether a “plaintiff” in the judicial system or a “petitioner” in a USPTO
proceeding, individuals shorting the stock of a corporation and then
instituting an adjudicatory action that potentially decreases the
defendant’s stock value should be treated identically.
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act has been characterized as
“powerful” due to its broad, general language.154 It prohibits the use of
“any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”155 The
scope of Section 10(b) has been expanded through rules promulgated by
the SEC, including Rule 10b-5, which prohibits the employment of “any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or the making of, “any untrue
statement of a material fact or . . . omit[ting] to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,” or
engaging, “in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.”156
152. Yahya, supra note 150, at 458. Yahya’s article discusses insider trading liability
for both plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers, noting that, theoretically, insider trading
liability exists for a plaintiff’s lawyer only if it also exists for the plaintiff. Id.
153. 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2016). Bass is not a “plaintiff” in the traditional litigation sense
but a “petitioner” in a trial before the PTAB. However, in this context the distinction is
insignificant, as the petitioner in an IPR is, like a plaintiff who institutes suit, “the party
filing a petition requesting that a trial be instituted.” Id.
154. Yahya, supra note 150, at 434.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
156. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
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Further, the Exchange Act specifically prohibits short sales “in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.”157 The broad language of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 supports an expanded definition of “insider” such that
manipulative investment behavior can be captured and regulated.
The scope of the Exchange Act has also been expanded by judicial
opinions. Insiders have been found not only to have an obligation not to
trade on material, non-public information themselves, but also to refrain
from tipping inside information to others.158 Specifically, a tippee can be
held liable for insider trading if he trades on information with the
knowledge that its disclosure breached the tipper’s fiduciary duties.159 In
Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court explained that tippee liability hinges on
whether the tipper’s disclosure breaches a fiduciary duty, which occurs
when the tipper “personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure.”160 Further, the Court held that a personal benefit may be
inferred where the tipper receives something of value in exchange for the
inside information or “makes a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend.”161
Recent case law has further clarified who faces insider trading
liability. In United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit found that
tippers are liable only when they have received a “potential gain of a
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”162 In Salman v. United States, the
Supreme Court clarified that the personal benefit the tipper derives need
not be monetary, finding that the Ninth Circuit appropriately applied
Dirks to allow the jury to infer a personal benefit based on familial
relationship.163 The treatment of tipper-tippee insider trading liability in
recent judicial decisions demonstrates the Court’s desire to be expansive
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
158. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1983).
159. Id. at 660.
160. Id. at 662.
161. Id. at 664.
162. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
163. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016).
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in its interpretation of “insider” such that bad actors can be captured by
the Exchange Act regulations.164
Given the broad language of Section 10 of the Exchange Act, the
public policy argument, and case law’s progression toward a broad
interpretation of “insider,” it would be appropriate to consider a short-
selling petitioner to be a temporary insider. Dirks provided certain
circumstances in which an individual working for a corporation has
fiduciary duties to the corporation’s shareholders, and thus can be
considered a temporary insider.165
Admittedly, the relationship of a short-selling petitioner to the
corporation involved is different from that of a lawyer or accountant, as
he does not owe any fiduciary duty to those whom he sold shares.
However, his knowledge of confidential information—namely, his intent
to challenge a patent—provides him with the same trading advantage as
a traditional insider. In either situation, the trader has information that
advises whether the stock will increase or decrease in value,166 and if he
fails to disclose, he will enrich himself at the expense of the public.
Therefore, a short-selling petitioner should be considered a temporary
insider, at least until the IPR challenge is publicly disclosed.
Similarly, holding a short-selling petitioner liable for insider trading
can also be addressed as outsider trading, which is “defined as the sale or
purchase of . . . securities on the basis of material[,] nonpublic information
by individuals who do not qualify as insiders.”167 The main obstacle to
164. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
165. “[W]here corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter,
accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may
become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is
not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that
they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business
of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes. . . .
When such a person breaches his fiduciary relationship, he may be treated more properly
as a tipper than a tippee.” Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (citations omitted).
166. It should be noted that the shorting bet will not pay off if the investor loses the
IPR challenge, but Bass’s strategy optimizes the likelihood of winning on the short bet
by specifically targeting weak patents.
167. Sergio Gilotta, The Regulation of Outsider Trading in the EU and US, COLUM.
L. SCH. BLUE SKYBLOG (Aug. 12, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/08/1
2/the-regulation-of-outsider-trading-in-the-eu-and-us/ [https://perma.cc/NL97-3BVS].
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charging Bass as an outsider is that, although he may have
misappropriated information, he had no fiduciary duty, as discussed
above. In Chiarella v. United States168 and Dirks, “the Supreme Court
rejected the equal access approach and held that [R]ule 10b-5 liability for
outsider trading requires a breach of a fiduciary duty.”169 In these and
other cases following the Second Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur,170 the Court rejected the approach that merely trading on the
basis of material, nonpublic information would constitute liability. The
Supreme Court feared that restrictions on insider and outsider
trading would reduce the efficiency of the market by disincentivizing
useful information-gathering.171 “Ironically, in an effort to accommodate
efficiency concerns, the Supreme Court’s insider trading doctrine has
become ill-suited for outsider trading—a practice that arguably has fewer
efficiency benefits than insider trading.”172
To charge Bass with outsider trading, the current state of the law
would have to “return to the Texas Gulf Sulphur line of reasoning that the
mere receipt of information triggers a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain
from trading,” and that equal access to information is the rationale
underlying prohibition against trading on inside information.173 Adopting
a broader prohibition of outsider trading would be in line with how our
European Union counterparts address outsider trading: “[d]ifferently
from [United States] law, the means and circumstances of information
acquisition play no role in determining whether the trading prohibition
applies. Simple possession of a piece of material[,] nonpublic
information, no matter how obtained, gives rise to a duty to abstain from
trading.”174
168. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
169. David A. Wilson, Note, Outsider Trading—Morality and the Law of Securities
Fraud, 77 GEO. L.J. 181, 187 (1988).
170. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420
(2016).
171. Wilson, supra note 169, at 187.
172. Id.
173. Hilary Harp, Outsider Trading After Dirks v. SEC, 18 GA. L. REV. 593, 601, 634
(1984).
174. Gilotta, supra note 167.
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Federal law regarding outsider trading has become obfuscated and it
has been proposed that the law should “abandon the theory that hinges
liability on a breach of fiduciary duty,” and replace it with a “fair play
obligation.” 175 “The fair play obligation would be violated when an
outsider (1) obtains material [,] nonpublic information, (2) trades on the
basis of that information before public disclosure, and (3) commits a
deception, misappropriation, or other violation of the law or of any
contractual obligation by obtaining the information, trading on it, or
both.”176 “A flexible obligation to play fairly reflects the market reality
that not everyone has the same information or equal access to
information.”177 Under this approach, “fair play would require disclosure”
or abstention from trade because the public does not expect patent
challenges “to be motivated by a desire to make profits in the securities
markets.”178
In support of instituting a fair play approach, it has been argued: “The
language of [R]ule 10b-5 supports th[is] approach since it purports to
cover ‘any act . . . which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any person.’
The legislative history of the . . . Exchange Act, too, counsels such a
reading. That history evinces congressional intent to prohibit ‘those
manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to
fulfill no useful function.’”179 The fair play approach lends credence to
conflating conflict of interest trading with outsider trading and prohibiting
and punishing such investment behavior accordingly.
B. MARKETMANIPULATION
The investment activity of a short-selling petitioner can be
considered stock market manipulation, and therefore falls within
SEC’s enforcement jurisdiction. 180 The SEC defines manipulation as
175. Wilson, supra note 169, at 213.
176. Id. (emphasis in original).
177. Id. at 214.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 213 (third and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted).
180. How Investigations Work, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html [https://perma.cc/JHU5-
7ZE6] (last modified Jan. 27, 2017).
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“intentional conduct designed to deceive investors by controlling or
artificially affecting the market for a security.”181 The Exchange Act
establishes prohibitions against the manipulation of securities prices,
including manipulative short sales.182 A short-selling petitioner can be
held liable for his investment behavior under a general theory of market
manipulation and securities fraud. Yahya postulates that two types of
market manipulation can be analogized to the behavior of the short-selling
plaintiff: the “pump and dump” and “cyber-smear” schemes.183
A “pump and dump” manipulation scheme typically involves
“spreading . . . positive false or misleading information” about a
corporation to generate interest in its stock, which generally leads to an
increase in stock price and allows those who spread the information to
make a profitable sale.184 A “cyber-smear” campaign can be thought of as
the inverse of a “pump and dump” scheme: “a short-seller spreads
negative false or misleading information” about a corporation, resulting
in a decrease in stock price and enabling a “profitable covering of a short
position by those spreading” the misinformation.185
Of these manipulation schemes, the one most applicable in the short-
selling petitioner scenario is “cyber-smear” given that the invalidation of
a company’s patent may cause a decrease in share price. The manipulation
that occurs in this situation is the withholding of the news that the
petitioner is instituting or plans to institute an IPR proceeding; thus, this
activity can be considered fraud by omission. Similar to other types of
fraudulent market manipulation, shareholder trading behavior when they
are unaware that a proceeding will be brought is different from what it
181. Fast Answers: Manipulation, U.S. SEC. &EXCHANGECOMMISSION, https://www
.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerstmanipulhtm.html [https://perma.cc/XK6N-EJMX] (last
modified Mar. 28, 2008).
182. “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, or for any member of a national securities exchange to effect a short
sale . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” 15
U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
183. Yahya, supra note 150, at 435.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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would be if they had complete and accurate information. The short-selling
petitioner takes advantage of the market by selling its short position to an
individual with incomplete information, knowing fully well the stock
price will likely decrease in value upon news of an IPR proceeding, and
almost certainly decrease if a patent is invalidated.
Superficially, the analogy seems to work. However, the problem that
Yahya points out with employing a general fraud theory here is that
“[u]nless there is absolutely no basis for the underlying suit, in which case
the attorney risks sanctions by the court, any lawsuit is presumed to have
some merit as long as the attorney had some good faith belief in the
validity of the suit.”186 Yahya is correct that, as the law currently stands,
it would not be possible to hold a short-selling petitioner liable for market
manipulation. However, Congress or the SEC could create a rule that
prevents a third-party petitioner in any patent litigation or USPTO
proceeding from holding a short position in the stock of the company
owning that patent, at least until the lawsuit or proceeding becomes public
knowledge. As discussed above in regard to insider trading, public policy
reasons dictate adapting the law to capture the type of behavior the
Exchange Act seeks to regulate but which it did not specifically
anticipate.
CONCLUSION
Truly “bad” patents should be invalidated, and the IPR system has
created an efficient way to achieve this social good. Entirely eliminating
third-party challenges would eradicate the very purpose for which IPR
was created; namely, to make it easier for interested third-parties to
institute challenges. By addressing hedge fund abuse of IPR through
financial regulation, it is possible to maintain the minimal standing
requirement, thus allowing post-grant patent challenges early in a
competing product’s life cycle, while prohibiting investors from profiting
from IPR challenges.
A short-selling petitioner can be held liable under either a general
fraud and market manipulation theory or an insider trading theory.
Holding the short-selling petitioner liable as a temporary insider is the
ideal solution to curb this investment behavior, as it does not necessarily
186. Id. at 452.
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entail congressional legislation or SEC rulemaking, but can be achieved
through further judicial interpretation of the term “insider.”
